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Abstract 
 
Poverty traps occurs when agents fail to coordinate their actions to achieve the optimal 
allocation of resources. It is argued that this phenomenon makes economic convergence 
impossible and keeps agents in a poverty trap from which they cannot escape unless a 
massive and coordinated industrial policy is implemented. This analysis shows that the 
literature on coordination failures has overemphasized the significance of market failure. 
It argues that coordination is possible and profitable in a free market system. State 
intervention is responsible for the systematic misallocation of resources 
(discoordination), in general, and for poverty traps in particular. 
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 1. Introduction 
 
Market failure is the utmost reason for defending an active economic role of the 
state. Among other market imperfection-based arguments, the theory of coordination 
failure is widely used at the present by development economists to define a new case for 
industrial policy (Matsuyama, 1995; Rodrik, 2006). 
The central pillar of the literature on coordination failure is the idea that economy 
can fail to achieve coordination among complementary activities. Coordination failure 
leads the market to an outcome (equilibrium) inferior to a potential situation where 
resources would be correctly allocated and all agents would be better off. 
The occurrence of these inefficient equilibria or poverty traps is supposed to 
provide an opportunity for a positive state intervention. It is argued that such situations 
can be overcome only by massive coordinated investments, something which is unlikely 
to happen if poor regions are left on their own. As Dercon (2003, p. 5) puts it, “A poverty 
trap is an equilibrium outcome and a situation from which one cannot emerge without 
outside help, for example, via a positive windfall to this group, such as by redistribution 
or aid, or via a fundamental change in the functioning of markets.” In a few words, 
poverty traps can be removed by a “big push” strategy. 
 This paper intends to provide a refutation of the idea that entrepreneurial 
coordination problems can lead to poverty traps. In subsidiary, it criticizes the claim that 
public intervention can improve the coordination of economic agents.  
 The paper is organized as follows. The next section puts the coordination failure 
argument in historical perspective. Section three describes the coordination failure 
argument which pushes the case for industrial policy, with a focus on the relation 
between coordination problems and poverty traps. Section four explains the role of 
entrepreneurs in achieving coordination on a free market. Section five criticizes the 
notion of coordination failure and underscores the weaknesses of “big push” theory, 
explaining the risks associated with development planning. The last section concludes the 
paper.  
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2. Intellectual pedigree: Rosenstein-Rodan, Nurkse, Hirschman  
 
The literature on coordination problems has a long tradition.1 A pertinent review 
of the literature on coordination failure can be found in Hoff (2000) and Hoff and Stiglitz 
(2001). Paul Rosenstein-Rodan, in his seminal 1943 article “Problems of Industrialization 
of Eastern and South-eastern Europe” argued that poor economies cannot grow because 
of coordination failure among complementary industries. If industrialization is 
simultaneously achieved in all economic sectors, industries could end up with profit, even 
though no sector would be profitable if it chooses to industrialize alone. As a result, an 
underdevelopment equilibrium was possible. To solve this problem, a large amount of 
investments are required – the so-called “big push” policy.  
In the 1950s, most economists thought that, if left to the impersonal forces of 
market, underdeveloped economies would never turn into rich and prosperous ones. 
Ragnar Nurkse (1953) argued that underdevelopment persists because of a so-called 
“vicious circle of poverty”: on the one hand, domestic market is thin because of low 
incomes and, on the other hand, the supply of goods is scarce exactly because people are 
too poor to save. Thus, the level of capital accumulation, investment and productivity is 
low. 
The assumption was that free market is unable to direct capital toward the most 
socially efficient investment projects. Unlike Nurkse, who favoured a uniform industrial 
policy – the doctrine of “balanced growth”, which required a massive investitional effort, 
i.e. a “big push” – Albert Hirschman (1958) maintained that developing countries lack 
also managerial and entrepreneurial abilities. Therefore, the optimal policy should have 
as a goal an unbalanced development, concentrating investments in those sectors with 
significant external effects, which can facilitate and promote complementary investments 
in the rest of the economy. 
The dissapointing results of state led industrialization and the collapse of central 
planned economies have convinced most economists to repudiate early development 
models. However, although “big push” strategies seemed to be definitively expelled from 
the realm of development economics, recently they have started again to claim the 
                                                          
1
 Graham and Temple (2005) consider that its origins can be traced back to Malthus. 
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attention of economists. “The big push has returned to favor in the development policy-
making, after half a century of exile” (Easterly 2005, p. 3). A good illustration of this 
change is the adoption of Millenium Development Goals by the U.N. which, claiming 
that many third world countries are kept in a poverty trap, argued for “a big push of basic 
investments between now and 2015 in public administration, human capital (nutrition, 
health, education), and key infrastructure (roads, electricity, ports, water and sanitation, 
accessible land for affordable housing, environmental management)” (U.N. 2005, p. 19). 
“Big push” policy is back in development economics because in the last decades a 
number of contributions have attempted to refine the case for industrial policy and 
ground it in a more solid theoretical bedrock. Using rational expectations hypothesis, 
several authors have atempted to formalize the coordination failure argument and 
elaborate a multiple equilibria theory of development. 
A reference work illustrating the resurgence of interest for coordination problems 
is Murphy, Shleifer, and Vishny (1989) which formalized some aspects of the 
Rosenstein-Rodan viewpoint. In addition, other development economists2 have 
emphasized a number of situations where interdependence among private agents seems to 
produce coordination failures that prevent economies from achieving a better 
equilibrium. 
After the publication of Sachs et al. (2004), this author has quickly become one of 
the foremost advocates of “big push” industrial policy of our times. Sachs’s influence is 
phenomenal throughout the world. He is a “guru” of economic development, “spiritual 
father” of numerous research institutes, initiatives and projects, and advisor for economic 
development policy in many countries. Economists like Rodrik (1996; 2004) and 
Rodriguez-Clare (2005a; 2005b) have used this particular market failure argument as 
justification for a “new industrial policy”, the goal of which is to induce entrepreneurs to 
invest in those projects with the highest social return. 
 
3. From coordination failure to big push policy 
 
                                                          
2
 See Acemoglu (1997); Adsera and Ray (1997); Azariadis and Drazen (1990); Easterly (2001); 
Matsuyama, (1991; 1996); and Krugman (1991) 
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As the coordination externality argument goes, the economy works like an 
ecosystem: 
 
“In an ecosystem, a key factor determining how any individual will 
behave is his environment. One of the most important aspects of that environment 
is the behavior of others. Under some conditions, ecosystems have multiple 
equilibria, and individuals may fail to “coordinate” on the equilibrium that is 
preferred by everyone… The basic mechanics of coordination failure are simple: 
An individual’s behavior – for example, to produce or to prey on the production 
of others – creates externalities. The externalities affect not only the welfare of 
others, but also their decisions. The interaction of the slightly distorted behaviors 
of many different agents may produce very large distortions and can lead to the 
existence of multiple equilibria, some very good for every member of the 
economy, and some very undesirable.” (Bowles, Durlauf and Hoff, 2006, p. 6-7)3 
 
For Matsuyama (1996, p. 2), this coordination problem, like "the problem of 
hundreds of people, scattered in a dense, foggy forest, trying to locate one another – is of 
such fundamental difficulty that no algorithm can solve it. What the economics of 
coordination tries to show is that even the market mechanism cannot solve the problem.” 
A good explanation of this market failure is provided by Rodriguez-Clare (2005) 
and Rodrik (2004). The former author (p. 3) points out the fact that the success or failure 
of an action depends upon the context in which it is undertaken: “A firm’s productivity 
depends not only on its own efforts and abilities, and on general economic conditions 
(e.g., the macroeconomic environment and the legal system), but also on the actions of 
other firms, infrastructure, regulation and other public goods”.4 
                                                          
3
 “Whereas neoclassical economics emphasizes the forces pulling toward equilibrium— and with similar 
forces working in all economies, all should be pulled toward the same equilibrium, modern development 
economics focuses more on evolutionary processes, complex systems, and chance events that may cause 
systems to diverge. Thus, it tends to be influenced more by biological than physical models…The economy 
is like an ecosystem, and Darwin was implicitly recognizing that ecosystems have multiple equilibria. Far 
more important in determining the evolution of the system than the fundamentals (the weather and 
geography) are the endogenous variables, the ecological environment. Luck—accidents of history—may 
play a role in determining that and, thus, in the selection of the equilibrium.” (Beyond Rosenstein, p. 14-15) 
4
 In such a case, the actions of different agents are “complements”.  
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On a more specific note, Rodrik (pp. 12-13) notes that 
 
“Many projects require simultaneous, large-scale investments to be made in order 
to become profitable. […] An individual producer contemplating whether to 
invest in a greenhouse needs to know that there is an electrical grid he can access 
nearby, irrigation is available, the logistics and transport networks are in place, 
qurantine and other public health measures have been taken to protect his plants 
from his neighbors’ pests, and his country has been marketed abroad as a 
dependable supplier of highquality orchids. All of these services have high fixed 
costs, and are unlikely to be provided by private entities unless they have an 
assurance that there will be enough greenhouses to demand their services in the 
first place. This is a classic coordination problem. […] More generally, 
coordination failures can arise whenever new industries exhibit scale economies 
and some of the inputs are non-tradable (or require geographic proximity).” 
 
Put it differently, the coordination problem illustrates the old proverbial chicken 
and egg dilemma. Agents cannot introduce a new good X on the market because they 
cannot rely on complementary suppliers of Y and Z but, in turn, suppliers of Y and Z 
have no reason to produce because there is not enough demand for their output. 
As Howitt (2001, pp. 3-4) argues, the coordination effort market participants put 
depends critically on their expectation that other individuals will act to take full 
advantage of potential gains from trade: “When people on one side of a market put more 
effort into the matching process, this makes it more worthwhile for those on the other 
side to do the same thing, because it makes transacting less costly for them.” For 
example, pessimistic expectations on the part of firms that they can find appropriate 
workers will make more costly for workers to find suitable jobs. A vicious circle seems to 
ensue, keeping the market at distance from an efficient allocation of resources. 
Following a similar line of reasoning, Marshall (p. 13-14) provides a good 
explanation of what is meant by coordination failure: 
 
“Suppose the economic performance of a country (or a firm, industry, or 
financial market) depends on large numbers of investors being willing to provide 
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funds. If it is generally believed that other investors will withhold funds, it is 
rational for any given investor to refrain from investing. Thus, these beliefs 
become self-fulfilling. This represents a coordination failure because everyone 
would be better off if all investors provided funds to the affected country. 
Unfortunately, there is no way to coordinate investor actions in this way.” 
 
More precisely, under the circumstances described above, there are multiple 
equilibria: a good equilibrium, obtained when entrepreneurs have optimistic expectations 
and thus manage to coordinate their businesses, and a bad equilibrium, resulting from 
entrepreneurs’ reluctance to invest and their failure to coordinate. When the market 
mechanism does not work, the government should coordinate (stimulate) entrepreneurs 
into the good equilibrium.  
This policy prescription echoes the arguments of Rosenstein-Rodan (1943) and 
Hirschman (1958) who argued for the necessity of a massive and concentrated 
industrialization policy (“big push” strategy) in order to break the underdevelopment 
equilibria. In light of the negative consequences of industrialization policy carried out by 
many developing countries in the 1960s and 1960s, market failure theorists are cautious, 
and insist that the solution requires skill rather than resources (Hoff, 2000). Essentially, 
the government should adopt policies that rein in the spillovers among entrepreneurs, 
paving the way for the good equilibrium. 
  
4. Alternative perspectives on coordination 
 
The proponents of coordination failure argument provide a very simple definition 
of coordination. In their view, coordination problems typically arise when “profitable 
new industries fail to develop unless upstream and downstream investments are coaxed 
simultaneously” (Rodrik 2004, p. 13). For example, “building an airport in a region that 
has no hotels would not lead to any traffic, but hotels without a regional airport may not 
be profitable either” (Rodriguez-Clare, 2005, p. 10). 
This view of coordination may be considered as simply a truism. If a successful 
investment occurs, it is profitable because it is properly integrated into a network of 
 8
complementary businesses. Inversely, any investment failure brings a loss because it does 
not fit in a suitable network of complementary businesses. 
The example does not demonstrate that market may fail in coordination; rather, it 
shows that not all potential activities can be brought in line into a coherent structure of 
production, and this is the reason for which some activities are not undertaken. Building 
an airport and hotels may be considered “complements”, but there is nothing special 
about them except the fact that they are two. We could add easily that building hotels, or 
highways, or museums, or fancy restaurants and shops, or providing ski transportation 
facilities, or artificial snow, are all complements because they can be used together. But 
the example does not say anything about how (in what combination), when, and 
especially if consumers do wish to buy their services. It does not say if consumers prefer 
to have this set of activities at 10,000 feet altitude or at the sea level. Most importantly, it 
overlooks the fact that if consumers do have a clear preference for all these (not yet 
existing) services, then they must stop supporting other alternative activities (farming or 
mining, for instance). 
It should be noticed that any action or policy has coordinating as well as 
discoordinating effects, and we are left without precise indication about what 
coordination is better. 
Alternatively, we can use the word “coordination” in a different sense. 
Coordination can be viewed not as a problem of technical complementarity/compatibility 
between different economic units, or as a problem of synchronization of producers, but as 
a relation between producers and consumers. 
The entire economic system is nothing but a combination of inter-related 
production processes. An efficient functioning of this social device requires a smooth 
coordination among its various activities. Because individuals’ preferences for various 
consumption goods alter endlessly, as well as their inter-temporal preferences and the 
availability of resources, producers need to revise their plans, and the configuration of 
production is continuously reshaped. Some production processes are dropped while other 
activities are undertaken. Economic development occurs when this structural change is 
fueled by capital accumulation and the production structure is widened and deepened.  
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The market process – that is, voluntary exchanges between individuals within a 
private property framework – has been considered for a long time an excellent 
mechanism for achieving spontaneous coordination. Adam Smith described 
metaphorically the process by which general welfare is enhanced as a result of each 
individual pursuing his own self-interest, using the expression “as if led by an Invisible 
Hand.” More accurately, Frederic Bastiat pointed out that the interests of all members of 
society are harmonious, even if they occasionally fail to act in harmony with each other.5 
However, error is inescapable. It is the result of human limited cognitive abilities 
(bounded rationality) and a highly complex network of economic relationships. It is 
optimistic to think that entrepreneurial effort (within the framework of a market order) 
can manage to overcome all coordination problems. Therefore, the existence of 
coordination failures cannot be disputed. The very existence of success stories reported 
by business magazines, the very fact that new entrepreneurs enrich themselves suggests 
the existence of coordination problems in the first place. 
Unfortunately, advocates of “big push” policy are biased in their analysis of 
market failure and poverty traps. It should be noted that development economists are not 
interested in analyzing coordination failures per se. The allocation of resources changes 
permanently, and there is a permanent need for recoordination of economic activities. 
Coordination failures happen everywhere. All regions and all countries are developing. 
Thus, in terms of coordination, the diference between rich regions (countries) and poor 
regions (countries) is only a matter of degree. (Matsuyama, 1995) Divergent economic 
evolutions happen all the time among various regions within every country. But, as 
Easterly (2006, p. 1) aptly notes, “no serious economist that I know of is proposing a Big 
Plan to triple US per capita income, or to end poverty in the US.” Instead, we hear this 
argument with reference to different countries. What is of interest is not infra-national 
coordination failures, but only inter-national coordination failures, and this for purely 
ideological reasons. 
 “The economy never reaches a state of full coordination. How close or how far 
away it is depends on how severe and how recent shocks have been in “wants, resources 
and technology” – and monetary conditions. The impossibility of perpetual full 
                                                          
5
 See Hülsmann (2001) for a pertinent account of Bastiat’s contribution to economics. 
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coordination is no defect of the market system. It is an inevitable consequence, rather, of 
the circumstances with which any economic system must cope.” (Yeager, p. 226) 
 
5. Entrepreneurship and coordination 
 
No mechanism can help us to achieve the perfect allocation of resources. 
However, the price mechanism is superior to other alternative means of coordinating 
economic activities. This verdict is based on the following considerations: 
a. rational calculation 
First of all, we must emphasize that in a market system coordination is possible 
because agents have a rational method for selecting what and how production processes 
should be coordinated. The essential instrument used by entrepreneurs in deciding upon 
the allocation of resources is monetary calculation.6 If their undertaking ends with a 
profit, then it means that resources were brought in line with consumers’ needs. If the 
result is a loss, then inputs were diverted from their optimal employment and wasted into 
less important activities. Therefore, entrepreneurs have a robust guide for selecting 
among competing production processes. On a free market, production is rational and 
coherent, always subordinated to consumers’ wishes. 
b. Incentives 
Again, this is not to say that the free market system manages to achieve a perfect 
coordination of economic decision-makers. There is still plenty of room left for 
imperfections, errors and discoordination, and the literature on bounded rationality 
provides many reasons for these failures. Yet this is a consideration of a different nature. 
The important fact is that agents have a strong weapon to fight against error. Individuals 
can use their rationality in choosing among alternative activities, despite any 
shortcomings that may infect their decision-making process. Investors and producers are 
stimulated to coordinate their businesses in order to respond to consumption demand. 
Failure to use resources to satisfy the most urgent consumers’ needs is penalized, while 
success is rewarded. 
                                                          
6
 Mises (1920) pointed out the crucial importance of economic calculation as an indispensable tool for 
coordinating the complex network of exchanges that constitutes an advanced economy. 
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“The entrepreneurial element in human action is the force that drives the market 
system towards a greater level of coordination. This force is unleashed because of the 
existence of pure profit that necessarily exists in disequilibrium situations.” (Sautet, p. 
31) 
Moreover, the presence of incentives improves the quality of judgment tasks, 
leading to a reduction of errors. Incentives affect the willingness of individuals to use 
resources to make optimal decisions. 
c. selection 
The profit and loss mechanism provides not only powerful incentives for avoiding 
error but also serves as a test for selecting the most able entrepreneurs. Only competent 
entrepreneurs pass the market test and are able to continue to produce, and they can stay 
on business only as long as they manage to demonstrate their abilities over and over 
again. 
The market process effectively coordinates productive efforts because the 
structure of prices is shaped according to the relative importance of resources for their 
final users – the consumers.7 More precisely, by forecasting future market conditions, 
entrepreneurs bid for resources in an attempt to increase investments in those production 
processes with the highest expected rate of return, that is, resulting in the output of those 
goods consumers need most. Thus, because the prices for factors of production are 
continuously adjusted to the expected prices of final goods, the emerging constellation of 
prices coordinates the various uses of resources and result in a coherent structure of 
production. 
 
 6. Paternalism and coordination economics 
 
Despite the profession’s tradition to use the economics of coordination failure as a 
base for public policy, a closer analysis suggests we should regard this habit with 
suspicion. There is still a huge gap between the actual arguments about the necessity of 
solving coordination failure through government-sponsored mechanisms and the 
                                                          
7
 An excellent description of the coordinative property of the market process can be found in Salerno 
(1991). 
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requirements these arguments have to fulfill in order to be considered scientifically valid. 
In what follows we will present shortly the three main arguments that can be advanced 
against industrial policy. 
a. The information argument 
One major problem is the lack of knowledge. Each decision-maker, private or 
public, possesses only very partial knowledge of the economic scene. The argument 
echoes the work of Hayek (1937; 1945), that argued that knowledge about economic 
allocation exists only in a dispersed form among individuals. Each agent do not posses a 
clear picture of the situation, but only “specific knowledge of time and place.” The 
crucial economic problem is to coordinate these bits of separate information, and this is 
precisely what the price system can do. 
Given that policymakers are not omniscient, they cannot know ex ante the optimal 
pattern of investments and consequently, are not able to improve the market outcome. 
This objection stipulates, in a popular and condensed form, that “government cannot pick 
winners.” The history of development policy is full with wrong decisions, which wasted 
resources into wrong investment projects, creating inefficient industries and social unrest. 
b. The incentive argument 
This argument is concerned with the lack of incentives for people to 
conserve/increase the value of resources whenever they do not own (have a property right 
over) these resources. It maintains that industrial policy is an invitation to corruption and 
rent-seeking. Once the government is in the business of providing support to firms, the 
incentives’ pattern changes, leading to perverse outcomes. It becomes profitable for 
private sector to withdraw resources from productive employment and channel them in 
the competition for political favors. Thus, such an institutional setting leads to a bad 
equilibrium, being itself a source of coordination failure. 
c. The calculation argument 
As Boettke and Leeson (2004) and Beaulier and Subrick (2006) show, 
development economists have to acknowledge the fact that social planners are neither 
benevolent nor omniscient. However, the free market cannot be defended successfully by 
pointing out that policymakers do not posses enough information to allocate resources 
optimally, or by emphasizing the corruptive nature of the state. As mentioned above, 
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some of the leading advocates of industrial policy acknowledge both these difficulties.8 
But they believe the quality of government’s activity can be improved. Therefore, we can 
accept, for the sake of argument, that perhaps government bureaucrats are both smarter 
(and better informed) than private entrepreneurs, and well intended. This hypothesis is, of 
course, completely imaginary, but it should not be dismissed only because it is 
empirically irrelevant. Government interventionism has to be criticized granted that 
policymakers are morally and intellectually the best members of society. 
In spite of its new clothes, government interventionism has no more solid 
foundation that it ever had. The problem with industrial policy is deeper than most of its 
critics admit. Starting with Mises (1990), a large Austrian literature argued that in the 
absence of private property, money prices cannot emerge and economic calculation is 
impossible. 
As Salerno (1994, p. 112) explained, the market process transforms the qualitative 
knowledge of various individuals about particular market conditions into quantitative 
data, i.e. market prices. Without such cardinal values, it is impossible to determine the 
relative profitability of different production processes, and therefore there is no guide for 
determining a superior pattern of resources’ allocation. 
At the limit, in a socialist commonwealth, the central planner has no rational way 
to decide whether to shift resources from project A to project B. Its intervention is 
arbitrary because cannot be subjected to the profit and loss test, as private activities are. 
As Rothbard (1962, p. 825) observed, any punctual decision to socialize investment 
introduces an island of calculational chaos in the market economy. Promises to bail-out 
entrepreneurs in case they fail to operate profitably, as Rodrik indicates, amount in a de 
facto socialization of private investments. 
The advocates of industrial policy think government can act as private businesses 
do, using the profit and loss criterion to decide between different investment projects. At 
this point, Rodriguez-Clare (2005, p. 28) believes that, “at least in principle, one could 
calculate a social return for such an investment. With limited resources, the obvious 
approach would be to invest in the proposals that entail the highest social returns. The 
problem, of course, is that calculating such social returns is very difficult. One (perhaps 
                                                          
8
 See especially Hausmann and Rodrik (2006) and Rodrik (2007). 
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limited) way to interpret prospective studies is as a way to facilitate this calculation.” 
Here, the author (to his own merit) touches the real problem of industrial policy. The 
state is not an entrepreneur, so it is not in position to “interpret” prospective studies the 
same way private individuals do.9 More precisely, policymakers cannot calculate as 
private entrepreneurs do. Therefore, their decision is merely a “leap into darkness”. 
The public allocation of resources raises insurmountable issues. One cannot say 
whether it is relatively more successful in coordination than the market process based on 
private property. Nothing prevents a priori government-sponsored allocation to result in a 
better coordination of economic activities in a certain region at a certain point in time. 
However, there are strong theoretical reasons for which this case is unlikely to happen. 
Without the possibility of economic calculation, proper incentives and an impersonal 
selection mechanism of entrepreneurs-coordinators, the discovery of optimal pattern of 
allocation is almost impossible. On the other hand, a market-based process of 
coordination includes powerful endogenous forces that systematically push the economy 
toward the best equilibrium. 
 
 7. Conclusion 
 
 In this paper I have tried to prove that the coordination failure argument does not 
provide a solid ground for a reshaping of the industrial policy because of its lack of sound 
theoretical foundation. We have seen that at the root of the argument is a 
misunderstanding of the role of entrepreneurs in industrial organization. Although the 
lack of conceptual precision makes the case for industrial policy appealing, coordination 
analysis cannot be used to improve the allocation of resources above the level reached on 
a free market. There is no recipe for industrial policy. Government intervention intended 
to repair the supposed market coordination failure, such us cluster-based targeting and 
infrastructure development are so widely practiced not because of scientific merit, but for 
political reasons. Last, but not in the least, the rationale for “big push” initiatives fails to 
address properly the information, incentives and calculation problems which plague 
                                                          
9
 Rather, as Buss (1999b, p. 367) says, “there are only individual or group interests that use public authority 
to their benefit, often at the expense of others.” 
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economic policy in general. Thus, numerous pitfalls prevent the “new” industrial policy 
to be considered a refined ingredient of development economics. 
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